Wage Growth, Human Capital and Risk Preference: Evidence From The British Household Panel Survey by Sarah Brown & Karl Talyor
Wage Growth, Human Capital and Risk Preference: 




Sarah Brown and Karl Taylor 
Department of Economics 
University of Leicester 
University Road, Leicester 





Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explore how interpersonal variation in risk preference affects human 
capital investment and, hence, wage growth. To date, there has been a distinct lack of empirical research 
in this area despite the fact that the risk preference of individuals plays a key role in the theoretical models 
of human capital accumulation. We investigate the link between risk preference, human capital investment 
and wage growth using data from four waves of the British Household Panel Survey using a measure of 
the extent of risky financial assets held by individuals as a proxy for risk preference. We exploit panel 
data enabling us to determine the change in real wages experienced by individuals across three different 
time horizons, 1995-96, 1995-98 and 1995-2000. Our empirical specification is derived from a theoretical 
framework, which explicitly allows the risk preferences of individuals to influence human capital 
accumulation and, consequently, wage growth. Our findings suggest that risk-loving behaviour impacts 
positively on the returns to human capital investment thereby enhancing wage growth. 
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I. Introduction 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the returns to investments in human capital, it is not 
surprising that the risk preference of individuals plays a key role in the theoretical 
models of human capital accumulation.
1 For instance, an individual may have to decide 
whether to invest in firm specific human capital or more general human capital when 
faced with uncertainty about the firm’s future as well as uncertainty prevailing in the 
labour market in general. A successful investment may lead to increases in remuneration 
or promotion whilst a less wise investment may lead to redundancy. The problem is 
exacerbated, as it is not clear how one can reduce the degree of risk associated with 
human capital investment. As pointed out by Shaw (1996), the standard approach to 
reducing risk in financial investment, namely diversification, is often not available in the 
context of human capital. Typically, an individual holds one job with his/her human 
capital investments tailored accordingly. Implicit contracts between the employer and 
the employee may provide some degree of insurance against adverse labour market 
conditions but it is not clear whether such contracts would extend to cases related to 
unknown ability.
2 To be specific, when the individual decides to make a particular 
investment in human capital, the rewards from such an investment may largely depend 
upon the individual’s ability in this particular area which may be unknown at the time 
when the decision to invest is made. 
Given the obvious problems in measuring risk preference, it is not surprising, 
that attitudes towards risk have attracted very little attention in the empirical literature.
3 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Johnson (1978), Levhari and Weiss (1974) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992).  
2 See Rosen (1985) and Malcolmson (1999) for comprehensive surveys of this area. 
3 There has however been a small number of studies which attempt to measure risk preference. Gaynor 
and Gertler (1995), for example, who explore contractual relationships in medical group practices, analyse 
self-reported risk preference measures based on the level of importance attached to the regularity of 
income. Hersch and Viscusi (1990) and Hersch and Pickton (1995) proxy risk preference by individuals’ 
cigarette smoking and seat belt use. Barsky et al (1997) adopt an experimental approach in order to elicit   3
In some empirical models of human capital accumulation, a parameter of constant risk 
aversion has been included,
4 but such an approach clearly does not allow the variation in 
risk aversion across individuals to play a role in the investment decision-making 
process. One important exception in the literature is Shaw (1996) who jointly models 
investment in human capital and financial wealth allowing for interpersonal differences 
in risk preference. The theoretical framework predicts an inverse relationship between 
an individual’s degree of risk aversion and human capital investment which in turn 
impacts upon wage growth. Using U.S. data, Shaw finds that wage growth has a positive 
correlation with those individuals willing to invest in risky assets such as stocks and 
shares which is taken as a proxy for risk preference.  
In this paper, we test the theoretical predictions from Shaw’s model using data 
derived from four waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), as well as 
extending her empirical framework. We concentrate upon the 1995 wave since it is only 
in this year that individuals are asked detailed questions pertaining to investments held 
in risky assets such as shares and unit trusts.
5 We use information derived from the 1995 
wave in order to determine how risk preference in 1995 affects estimated returns to 
human capital and hence wage growth over three periods 1995 to 1996, 1995 to 1998 
and 1995 to 2000. One of the main advantages of the BHPS is the rich set of proxies 
available to capture risk preference. As well as having a variable denoting the share of 
financial wealth in investments, we are able incorporate information on the type of 
investment.  
                                                                                                                                                
individual preference parameters. Participants were asked to respond to situations designed to yield 
information about their risk aversion such as their willingness to gamble lifetime income. Similarly, 
Hartog et al (2002) derive an empirical measure of risk aversion by asking individuals how much they are 
willing to pay to participate in a specific lottery. 
4 Such studies include Brown and Rosen (1987), Moore (1987) and Murphy and Topel  (1987). Belzil and 
Hansen (2002), however, dispense with this assumption. 
5 The information is also available in the 2000 wave, but at present there is no available data beyond this 
year which would allow us to explore how risk preference in 2000 affects future wage growth.   4
The paper is set out as follows: Section II summarises the theoretical 
underpinnings to our thesis whilst Section III describes the data and methodology. Our 
empirical findings are presented in Section IV whilst final comments and policy 
implications are collected in Section V. 
II. Theoretical Considerations 
The theoretical framework developed by Shaw (1996), which is summarised below, is 
based on a portfolio allocation model extended to incorporate an individual’s decision to 
invest in human capital as well as financial assets. The optimal allocation equations 
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where  () t s  is share of current human capital allocated to producing new human capital 
and  () t α  is the share of financial wealth allocated to a portfolio of risky assets. In 
addition, () η µ − h  denotes the net return to human capital investment and 
2
h σ  represents 
the variance of its return. The net return to financial investment is given by () r − µ  and 
2
f σ  denotes the variance of the return.
6 Finally, R denotes the Pratt-Arrow index of 
constant relative risk aversion. It is apparent from Equation 1 that there is an inverse 
relationship between risk aversion and investment in human capital. 
                                                 
6 In Equation 1, h µ  denotes the mean return to human capital investment and η  denotes the marginal rate 
of substitution between financial wealth and human capital. In Equation 2,µ  represents the expected 
return on the risky asset portfolio whilst r represents the risk free return.   5
In order to derive an expression for wage growth, wages at time t and time t – 1 
are defined as follows: 
()() ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 − − + − = − = t t t t t t t K s s K s w γ        ( 3 )  
() 1 1 1 1 − − − − = t t t K s w           ( 4 )  
where  () t K  denotes human capital at time t  and  t γ  is the productivity of  1 − t s . Hence 
wage growth can be expressed as: 
() 1 1 ln ln − + ≈ ∆ t t t s w γ           ( 5 )  
Assuming  1 − ≈ t t s s  and small  1 − t ts γ : 
1 ln − ≈ ∆ t t t s w γ          ( 6 )  
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Following Shaw (1996), we assume that each investor has the same perceptions of 
returns to risky investments hence the term ( )
2
f r σ µ −  in Equation 2 is constant across 
individuals. Risk aversion R can thus be identified from Equation 2 and is an inverse 
function of the share of investments in risky assets α . We can rewrite Equation 2 as 
bR 1 = α  where  r b f − = µ σ
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The term  () η µ γ − h  is equal to the productivity of human capital and can be restated as 
follows, adding i subscripts to indicate individuals: 
() i i i hi i u + = − β η µ γ X          ( 9 )    6
where X is an observed matrix of human capital and  i u  represents measurement error in 
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where the error term is defined as  ( ) i hi i i u b
2 σ α ε =  and so may not be homoscedastic. 
Given that the matrix X contains human capital variables the intuition underlying 
Equation 10 is that those individuals who hold large shares of risky assets  i α  are less 
risk averse and so will invest in greater amounts of human capital, Shaw (1996).
7,8 It is 
apparent from Equation 10 that risk-taking as measured by  i α  will shift all estimated 
returns to human capital in the matrix X upwards by the amount ( )
2
hi b σ  representing an 
intercept effect. Furthermore, risk preferences may also influence the returns to human 
capital by ( )β σ
2
hi b  representing a slope effect. It is somewhat surprising to note that 
this second effect is largely ignored by Shaw (1996) especially since the overall effect of 
risk preferences stems from the combined impact of the slope and intercept effects. Both 
the intercept and slope effects of risk-preferences are shown in Figure 1 below.  
<<FIGURE 1 HERE>> 
We therefore aim to explore the determinants of real wage growth via non-linear least 
squares estimation given the nature of the functional form underlying Equation 10. 
 
                                                 
7 Similarly, Guiso et al (1996) recognise the influence of earnings risk on a household’s demand for risky 
assets and report an inverse relationship between investment in risky assets and income risk. Moreover, it 
is apparent that income risk may be influenced by investment in human capital. 
8 Although the theoretical model predicts a positive association between risk loving behaviour and human 
capital investment, it is clearly important to explore the empirical validity of this ascertain. It may be the 
case for example that individuals who are risk averse are more likely to invest in human capital in order to 
safeguard their future, this provides some intuition to explain an inverse relationship.   7
III. Data  and  Methodology 
Given that the aim of this paper is to explore how interpersonal variation in risk 
preference affects human capital investment, we require panel data whereby the same 
individuals are tracked across time enabling us to determine the change in real wages 
experienced by individuals over time and, hence, wage growth at the individual level. 
Our data set is derived from four waves of the BHPS – 1995, 1996, 1998 and 2000. This 
is a random sample survey carried out by the Institute for Social and Economic Research 
of each adult member of a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 private 
households (yielding approximately 10,000 individual interviews). For Wave one, 
interviews were conducted during the autumn of 1991. The same individuals are re-
interviewed in successive waves - the latest available being wave ten in 2000. The main 
objective of the BHPS is ‘to further understanding of social and economic change at the 
individual and household level in Britain.’  
We concentrate upon the 1995 wave since it is only in this year that individuals 
are asked detailed questions pertaining to investments held in risky assets such as shares 
and unit trusts which we use to construct our measure of risk preference.
9  We use 
information derived from the 1995 wave in order to determine how investments held in 
risky assets in 1995 affect estimated returns to human capital and hence wage growth 
over the periods 1995 to 1996, 1995-1998 and 1995-2000. To evaluate the impact of risk 
preference upon human capital investment we only require information on risk 
preference in the base year, 1995. Although, Equation 10 is a growth equation and so 
wages are differenced, all explanatory variables relate to the base year. 
 
                                                 
9 Banks et al (2002) use the 1995 and 2000 waves from the BHPS to provide a descriptive investigation of 
the distribution of financial wealth over the period.   8
We explore wage growth over three different time periods in order to ascertain 
the robustness of our risk proxy and in addition to determine whether it has a different 
impact over alternative wage growth horizons. The time periods we consider are as 
follows: first difference, 1995-1996; third difference, 1995-1998 and fifth difference 
1995-2000. Our sample consists of individuals in employment aged between 16 and 65. 
We exclude the self-employed, agricultural workers and individuals with more than one 
job. After conditioning on individuals who have data responses on the investment 
questions which are of key interest to our study,
10 the sample sizes for the three growth 
periods are 3,105 for the first difference sample, 2,441 for the third difference sample 
and 2,294 for the fifth difference sample. 
The dependant variable, the relevant difference in log real hourly wages 
according to the time period under investigation, is derived from usual gross pay per 
month from current job. The focus of the paper concerns the influence of risk preference 
on human capital formation and, consequently, wage growth. In order to measure risk 
preference, we follow Shaw (1996) and interact the risk preference of individuals with 
human capital accumulation, by replacing  i α   in Equation 10 with a proxy for risk 
aversion denoted by the variable  Asset , which represents the proportion of net wealth 
held in investments.
11   
Our measure of risk aversion, Asset , is defined as follows: 




=        ( 1 1 )  
Figures 2 to 7 present the distribution of  Asset  across our three growth samples for all  
                                                 
10 Note that those individuals who respond to the investment question in the BHPS may report zero 
investments, see below. 
11 Shaw (1996) also measures risk aversion via survey information whereby individuals were asked about 
their attitudes towards financial risk. Such information however is not available in the BHPS.   9
employees as well as for only those employees with positive asset shares. It is apparent 
from Figures 2, 3 and 4 (for all employees) that the large majority of employees have 
zero asset shares in accordance with the findings of Shaw (1996) for the U.S. We will 
explore whether the skewness of assets (as defined by Equation 11) towards a uniform 
mass point of zero impinges on our results in the following section. 
<<FIGURES 2 TO 4 HERE>> 
We are also able to control for the composition of investments in risky assets 
consisting of: Shares; Personal Equity Plans (PEPs); Unit Trusts and other investments 
(including government and company securities) given by  j Type  where j=1…4. The 
reference group is risk free investments (comprising of Premium Bonds, National 
Savings and Building Society Accounts, and Tax Exempt Special Savings Accounts – 
TESSAs) plus no investments. Our split between risky and risk free investments is close 
to that of Georgarakos (2002).
12 Also included in the model apart from human capital 
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where d=1,3,5 represents the length of the difference, so,  1995 1996
1 ln  ln  ln  , i , i i w w w − = ∆ , 
1995 1998
3 ln  ln  ln  , i , i i w w w − = ∆ , and  1995 2000
5 ln  ln  ln  , i , i i w w w − = ∆ . The impact of risk 
preferences upon human capital thus stems from an intercept and slope effect, ( ) j λ π +  
and  ( ) j λ π β +  respectively.  
                                                 
12 Note that whilst Georgarakos (2002) considers asset ownership using the Family Resource Survey this 
dataset is cross sectional and so cannot be employed for the analysis herein, since to analyse wage growth 
we need information upon the same individuals over time.   10
Turning to the measures of human capital specified in the matrix, X, the BHPS, 
in contrast to the data set exploited by Shaw (1996), provides information on highest 
education qualifications rather than relying on a simple years of school index. We also 
control for labour market experience entered in a quadratic form as well as the extent of 
job turnover within the relevant sample period. 
In addition, we are able to control for a host of key characteristics, entering the H 
matrix, which are likely to influence wage growth such as occupation, industrial 
affiliation and regional location (with 8, 8 and 10 categories respectively), as well as 
demographic characteristics such as gender, marital status and ethnicity. We are also 
able to control for other factors related to the job such as trade union membership and 
the type of employment contract held by the individual. The inclusion of the contract 
type captures the effects of other types of risk akin to the theoretical model of Caroli and 
Garca-Penalosa (2002). To summarise, the H matrix contains a much richer array of 
control variables than that specified by Shaw (1996). 
Full summary statistics for all of the variables used in our empirical analysis for 
all three samples are presented in Table 1 below, with information in the first column 
stating where each variable is assigned in terms of the X or H matrix. Clearly across the 
different samples the average share of investments is around 21 per cent. Considering 
the composition of the asset variable, the commonest type of investment is in shares at 
approximately 17 per cent with other investments making up the smallest category. In 
terms of educational variables, the commonest educational qualification appears to be 
GCSE grades A-C at 24 per cent followed by further education and degrees at 22 per 
cent and 16 per cent respectively. The turnover variable is designed to capture how 
frequently an individual changes job and hence the effects of changes in firm specific 
human capital within the relevant sample period. In the first difference specification this   11
is a simple dummy variable where one denotes that an individual has changed job, so 34 
per cent of individuals have changed job between 1995 and 1996. However, in the third 
and fifth difference samples the number of times an individual has changed job is 
specified. 
<<TABLE 1 HERE>> 
IV. Results 
In all of the results which follow, the key coefficients of interest are shown in the shaded 
areas of Tables 2 to 6.
13 Table 2 below presents the results of estimating Equation 12, 
omitting controls for type of asset so  0 = j λ , across the three different wage growth 
horizons, whereby we allow for heterogeneity in risk aversion at the individual level.
14,15 
<<TABLE 2 HERE>> 
The estimated coefficient on the asset variable, our measure of risk preference, which 
serves to shift the intercept (see Figure 1), is statistically significant and positive across 
each period, suggesting robustness of the results. The sign of the asset coefficient 
suggests that those individuals who are willing to take greater investments experience 
higher rates of wage growth. Such an effect serves to shift all estimated returns to 
human capital upwards by the amount ( )
2
hi b σ  as discussed in Section II. Furthermore, it 
is apparent that the return to risk-taking increases monotonically across the growth 
horizons. 
A striking feature from the results reported in Table 2 is that the returns to low 
education are larger than the returns to high education, although the returns to education 
                                                 
13 The controls in Tables 2 to 6 consist of industry, occupational and regional dummy variables, each 
jointly significant at the 1 per cent level. 
14 In order to allow for identification of the  λ π, and  β ’s, we normalise on the ‘no education’ category. 
15 For all of the results which follow, the error term  ( ) i hi i i u b
2 σ α ε =  (see Section II) has to be tested for 
heteroscedasticity where throughout the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected at the 1 
per cent level.   12
are positive for all levels of educational attainment. The estimated coefficients on the 
educational attainment variables represent the second effect stemming from risk 
interactions, as discussed in Section II above, where the returns to human capital are 
influenced by attitudes towards risk. The joint intercept and slope effects as depicted in 
Figure 8 are given by () ( )
2 1 hi b σ β + , which is equal to ( )π β ˆ ˆ + 1  in terms of Equation 12. 
The intercept effect is depicted by the gap between the two parallel dotted lines, whilst 
the slope effects indicated by the estimated coefficients on the educational attainment 
dummy variables are depicted by the two solid lines. 
<<FIGURE 8 HERE>> 
When interpreting the results, it is important to acknowledge that this is not a wage 
equation but a wage growth model and also that the returns to education are in effect 
non-linear interactions with the individual risk preference variable. The returns from 
human capital investment for risk lovers who initially have relatively low levels of 
educational attainment are greater than that for those with relatively high levels of 
educational attainment, for instance GCSE versus Degree. This may reflect the fact that 
those with low educational attainment are willing to take greater risks or that they have 
greater scope for investment in human capital.
16  
Similarly, when one interprets the experience terms, which are interacted with 
risk preference, it is important to acknowledge that we are estimating a wage growth  
                                                 
16 To explore these issues more fully we split our sample into a high education group (degree and further 
education only) and a low education group (A level and below), yielding sample sizes of 877 and 1,417 
respectively. We then estimate Equation 12 for the fifth difference wage growth period for each sample 
separately. To allow identification the omitted categories are ‘further’ and ‘no education’ respectively. 
 Degree A  level GCSE  A-C GCSE  <C 
High 0.999  12%  - - - 
Low -  1.029  9%  1.280  18%  1.807  27% 
The results along with the percentage change in coefficient compared to column 1 Table 2 are summarised 
above, with all coefficients shown significant at the 5 per cent level or above. It is apparent that the 
greatest percentage change is for the lower education group, thus confirming our a priori expectations that 
those with the lower levels of educational attainment are faced with greater scope for investment in human 
capital.   13
model. Hence, our results imply that the returns to risk-taking diminish as experience 
increases. It is surprising to note that the estimated coefficient on the turnover variable 
which captures the effect of job moving on wage growth, is positive yet insignificant. 
Turning to the variables entering the H matrix, males appear to experience higher 
wage growth than females. The quality of education captured by the private education 
dummy variable is insignificant. Immigrants have significantly greater wage growth in 
the first and third difference models whilst married individuals experience lower wage 
growth which is generally significant across the three time horizons. In accordance with 
Shaw (1996), trade union membership impacts negatively on wage growth. We also 
investigate whether having a permanent contract impinges upon wage growth. This 
variable may also be capturing attitudes towards risk following the argument put 
forward by Caroli and Garca-Penalosa (2002). We discover, however, that this variable 
only exerts a significant negative effect in the third difference specification, which may 
reflect the length of fixed term contracts. Finally, our results suggest that firm size 
impacts in a positive yet diminishing fashion on wage growth.
17 
Robustness 
In order to explore the strength of our findings, we undertake a number of robustness 
tests. Initially, we consider whether the composition of the investments affects our 
findings. It is clear from the results of this exercise, which are shown in Table 3, that our 
findings do not alter significantly. To be specific, the asset variable is characterized by a 
positive and significant coefficient across all three time horizons, in terms of Figure 1 
implying a positive intercept shift, and increases monotonically across time. In addition, 
over the five-year period, shares, PEPs and unit trusts play a role in explaining wage 
                                                 
17 We have explored incorporating measures of general human capital in the H matrix despite the fact that 
the theoretical model of Section II does not encapsulate this. The inclusion of such variables does not 
substantially alter our findings.   14
growth, which is apparent over the other time horizons but at a lower level of 
significance (10 per cent). The joint intercept and slope effects are given by 
( )( ) j ˆ ˆ ˆ λ π β + + 1.  
<<TABLE 3 HERE>> 
Unfortunately, the BHPS does not provide information on the amount of 
investments held in risky assets, only an overall investment holding. Another way to 
attempt to circumvent this problem, apart from introducing composition controls as 
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d Type Asset w ε γ β θ ∆ + + × =∑
=
H X ln                   (13) 
The results are shown in Table 4 below all based upon fifth differences, i.e. d=5.
18 
Initially in the first column we estimate Equation 13 where we find that the asset-share 
interaction is significant – implying a positive intercept shift in terms of Figure 1 given 
by  j ˆ θ . This positive intercept shift is only occurring through the asset-share interaction, 
which arguably represents the most risky investment available to the individual.  
There is also evidence of risk-preferences influencing the returns to human 
capital i.e. a slope effect given by  β θ ˆ ˆ
j  since all human capital interactions are 
significant. Again it is clear that the returns from human capital investment for risk 
lovers who initially have relatively low levels of educational attainment are greater than 
that for those with relatively high levels of educational attainment. 
<<TABLE 4 HERE>> 
                                                 
18 We have also experimented with wage growth equations over different difference horizons but our 
results did not change dramatically and so for the sake of brevity are omitted, but available upon request 
from the authors.   15
A potential problem with the estimates so far is that one could argue that we are 
simply picking up an income effect. That is, those individuals who hold assets have 
higher wages and so experience greater wage growth. For instance, if wage growth is 
correlated with high levels of income, and high income individuals are risk takers, then 
the impact of risk attitudes upon wage growth could simply imply a wage-income 
correlation rather than a relationship between risk and wage growth. This is essentially a 
problem of endogeneity bias. We would argue against this however, on the grounds that 
we enter risk-preferences in levels into a wage growth, i.e. differenced, equation. Hence 
we are not estimating a relationship between the change in asset share (potentially an 
income effect) and wage growth. Another way to address this problem is to instrument 
the asset variable. To do this we regress the investment share upon a quadratic in age, 
human capital and income variables (the results are shown in Table A1 in the appendix). 
We then take the predicted values from this model and estimate Equation 12, without 
composition effects so  0 = j λ . The results are shown in the second column of Table 4. 
Interestingly the instrumented asset variable has a negative sign, which in terms of 
Figure 1, suggests a negative intercept effect  0 < π ˆ , i.e. at zero human capital 
accumulation the wage growth of the risk averse is greater than that of risk lovers. 
However, when considering the human capital interactions the results suggest that there 
are positive slope effects from risk taking behaviour, again with evidence of lower 
returns for high education groups vis à vis low education attainment. In the final column 
of Table 4, we estimate Equation 13 but with the investment variable instrumented. 
Generally our findings are consistent with those as described above in that there is a 
positive intercept shift as well as significant and positive slope effects. 
The fourth robustness check concerns the definition of net worth used in  Asset  
which largely follows that of Shaw (1996) who in turn bases this definition on Friend   16
and Blume (1975). It is important to note, however, that in their analysis of risky assets, 
Friend and Blume (1975) include liabilities to net worth. Such liabilities are not 
incorporated in the analysis of Shaw (1996). Hence, in the following set of results, we 
attempt to control for the level of debt reported by the individual. The results of this 
exercise are shown in Table 5. 
<<TABLE 5 HERE>> 
In order to control for the effects of individuals’ debt, initially in the first column of 
Table 5 we replicate the first column of Table 2, based upon Equation 12, but add log 
debt as a control. Interestingly, the investment share and debt variable enter with 
opposite signs, although the net intercept effect in terms of Figure 1 is positive. The 
slope effects are also positive and significant with those individuals with higher 
investment shares experiencing larger returns to human capital. The second and third 
columns of Table 5 replicate those of column one Table 3 (composition effects) and the 
first column of Table 4 (risky asset interactions). Again, our results show that even when 
allowing for debt, investment composition and risky asset interactions, the risk 
preferences of individuals exert a positive effect acting through both intercept and slope 
changes. The only exception is in the final column of Table 5 where the risk-
composition interactions all display insignificant intercept effects at the 5 per cent level 
but positive and significant slopes effects with respect to the education attainment 
variables. 
As mentioned in Section III, a further potential problem with our measure of risk 
is that the large majority of employees have zero asset shares. We now explore whether 
this skewness towards the uniform mass point of zero for assets impinges upon the 
results presented thus far. Restricting our sample to those employees reporting positive 
asset shares yields a sample size of 667.    17
<<FIGURES 5 TO 7 HERE>> 
The distributions of the asset variable across each of the three time horizons are depicted 
in Figures 5 to 7. The focus is upon the asset and composition interactions as these are 
most likely to be capturing risk preferences. We replicate the fifth difference results 
presented in Table 4 column one for those reporting positive asset shares estimating 
Equation 13 with the results shown in first column of Table 6, below. The asset and 
risky investment interactions are all characterised by positive coefficients, although 
these intercept effects are only significant at the 10 per cent level for asset-shares and 
asset-peps. Interestingly, the interactions with the educational attainment variables are 
now relatively larger with the exception of the ‘other’ category, implying larger slope 
effects, i.e. individuals with positive asset shares have greater returns to human capital 
when interacted with risk-composition effects. 
<<TABLE 6 HERE>> 
Following Shaw (1996), we consider the proposition that individuals with 
positive turnover, i.e. job-movers, are relatively more risk loving than those who stay in 
the same firm. In order to explore this issue, we restrict our sample to those with 
positive turnover over the five-year period yielding 775 observations. Our results, based 
upon Equation 13, are presented in the second column of Table 6, and show that the 
asset-composition interactions (capturing the ‘intercept effects’) are all insignificant 
apart from that of shares – arguably the riskiest asset, which is much larger and 
significantly different to its counterpart shown in column one Table 4. Turning to the 
slope effects, the returns to education are all significant and noticeably smaller than 
those reported in column one Table 4. The findings suggest that the risk preferences of 
these individuals are biased in favour of risk-loving behaviour in terms of the intercept 
effect, in accordance with Shaw’s findings, but surprisingly the slope effects do not   18
support this hypothesis. Rather our findings suggest the relationship depicted in Figure 9 
whereby the intercept for job movers is higher than that for all individuals (stayers and 
movers) – two possible shifts are depicted. Furthermore, it is apparent from the diagram 
that the slope for the job movers is relatively shallow as suggested by our empirical 
findings. 
<<FIGURE 9 HERE>> 
  The final issue that we address concerns a key assumption underlying the 
theoretical model of Section II where attitudes towards risk in period t (1995) are 
assumed to reflect an individual’s preferences at the time of human capital accumulation 
which may have occurred at some period t-h. It is surprising that Shaw (1996) does not 
allude to this concern. The problem is exacerbated as our risk measure in 1995 akin to 
that of Shaw coincides with human capital already accumulated. One way in which this 
problem could be circumvented is if risk preference at the time of the human capital 
investment is time invariant.  Modelling the decision to hold risky assets, following 
Guiso et al (1996), when we regress the asset share against income, education, and age 
entered in quadratic form, the age terms are insignificant.
19 This finding suggests that 
risk preferences may be time invariant and is consistent with the findings for the USA, 
see Halisassos and Bertaut (1995). Although these findings do appear to justify our 
methodology, we subject our analysis to further scrutiny by exploring the influence of 
recent investments in human capital.  
To be specific, our proxy for risk preference relates to investment in risky assets 
in 1995, hence we explore the effect of human capital investment at the same point in 
time. This is particularly important as educational attainment may reflect human capital 
                                                 
19 The age terms only become significant when income is dropped, which suggests that the quadratic in 
age may just be picking up an income effect i.e. older people have higher incomes and this is correlated 
with assets. This is the equation we used above to allow instrumentation of the asset variable – the results 
are shown in Table A1 in the appendix.   19
investments made sometime ago. To do this we include a dummy variable to capture 
whether an individual has had recent employer training to increase/enhance skills and 
also a variable representing the number of days of non-employer training. We also 
control for increases in highest educational attainment at 1995 whereby we distinguish 
between ‘small’ changes (one or two upward movements in the education hierarchy) and 
‘large’ changes (more than two upward movements in the education hierarchy). The 
results are presented in the final column of Table 6, where we estimate a model of the 
form shown in Equation 13. It is apparent that the asset-share interaction is significant as 
found above, once again suggesting a positive intercept effect. There is still clearly a 
role for risk preferences to influence the returns to human capital. These effects are all 
significant at the 5 per cent level, excluding the returns to A levels, and robust to the 
inclusion of recent human capital accumulation. Interestingly, employer training effects 
which represent recent human capital investment are negative. This may be picking up 
the fact that individuals receive training at the start of their career and moreover during 
such training periods wage growth may be relatively low. 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored how interpersonal variation in risk preference affects 
human capital investment and, hence, wage growth. We have investigated the link 
between risk preference and wage growth using data from four waves of the BHPS. In 
general, our findings suggest that those individuals who are willing to take greater risks 
receive higher rates of wage growth. Moreover, we have found that this result is 
particularly robust in terms of both changes to the underlying empirical specification as 
well as changes to the sample of individuals analysed.   20
To date, there has been a distinct lack of empirical research in this area in spite of 
the finding that risk aversion exerts a moderating influence on wage growth. This should 
be of key interest to policy makers, since our findings suggest that the presence of risk 
aversion may deter individuals from investing in human capital. This could serve to 
erode productivity and hence may exert adverse effects on economic growth. 
Furthermore, our findings may have implications for income distribution – if risk 
preference and wage growth are correlated, then the variability of risk preference and 
changes in the composition of assets over time (see Banks et al, 2002) should impact 
upon the distribution of income. Given the importance of such findings for 
policymaking, it is surprising that there is a distinct lack of research in this area. 
Hopefully our findings may serve to stimulate further research on the relationship 
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 Figure 8: The impact of risk attitudes upon returns to education 
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Risk Loving: Job 
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shift 2) TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
   5
TH DIFFERENCE  3
RD DIFFERENCE  1
ST DIFFERENCE 
   Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum 
∆W  Log  wage  growth  0.1437  -2.1707 2.3493  0.0811  -2.1655 3.3347  0.0337  -2.2742  2.669 
X  Asset  0.2117  0 1  0.2084  0 1  0.2071  0 1 
X  Log  Debt  -5.8861  -18.4207  10.6522  - -  - - -  - 
X  Shares  0.1792  0 1  0.1728  0 1  0.1729  0 1 
X  PEP  0.0654  0 1  0.0684  0 1  0.0689  0 1 
X  Unit  Trust  0.0414  0 1  0.0430  0 1  0.0441  0 1 
X  Other  Investment  0.0292  0 1  0.0238  0 1  0.0271  0 1 
X  Experience  23.9425  2 50  24.444  2 57  24.728  3 57 
X  Experience  Squared/10  69.1342  1 250  72.826  1 325  75.318  1 325 
X  Turnover  1.3001  0 6  1.5422  0 5  0.3449  0 1 
X  Degree  0.1622  0 1  0.1536  0 1  0.1623  0 1 
X  Further  Education  0.2201  0 1  0.2204  0 1  0.2113  0. 1 
X  A  Level  0.1417  0 1  0.1381  0 1  0.1356  0 1 
X  GCSE  grades  A-C  0.2419  0 1  0.2392  0 1  0.2351  0 1 
X  GCSE  grades  <C  0.0488  0 1  0.0537  0 1  0.0473  0 1 
X  Other  Qualification  0.0497  0 1  0.0442  0 1  0.0489  0 1 
X  No  Qualifications  0.1356  0 1  0.1487  0 1  0.1568  0 1 
X  Employer Training   0.0802  0  1  -  -  -  -  -  - 
X  Non-Employer Training   0.3801  0  40  -  -  -  -  -  - 
X  Education Change 1  0.5192  0  1  -  -  -  -  -  - 
X  Education Change 2  0.1478  0  1  -  -  -  -  -  - 
H  Male  0.5078  0 1  0.5031  0 1  0.4969  0 1 
H  Private  0.0567  0 1  0.0549  0 1  0.0554  0 1 
H  White  0.9690  0 1  0.9644  0 1  0.9701  0 1 
H  Immigrant  0.0462  0 1  0.0537  0 1  0.0493  0 1 
H  Married  0.7576  0 1  0.7587  0 1  0.7424  0 1 
H  Trade  Union  0.3418  0 1  0.3449  0 1  0.3339  0 1 
H  Firm  Size  1-24 0.2847  0 1  0.2868  0 1  0.2937  0 1 
H  Firm  Size  25-99  0.2650  0 1  0.2642  0 1  0.2612  0 1 
H  Firm  Size  100-499  0.2668  0 1  0.2671  0 1  0.2651  0 1 
H  Permanent  0.9477  0 1  0.9501  0 1  0.9485  0 1 
 Observations  2,294 2,441 3,105 TABLE 2: Wage Growth across different time horizons 
 5
TH DIFFERENCE  3
RD DIFFERENCE          1
ST DIFFERENCE 
Asset  0.4919  ***  (3.68)  0.3429  ***  (3.15)  0.1735  **  (2.25) 
Experience  -0.0729  ***  (6.25)  -0.0469  ***  (3.80)  -0.0705  ***  (3.63) 
Experience squared  0.0104  ***  (4.32)  0.0051  **  (1.94)  0.0111  ***  (2.85) 
Turnover  0.0018    (0.17)  0.0708    (1.10)  0.2789    (1.26) 
Degree  0.8927  ***  (6.13)  0.5988  ***  (3.33)  0.7854  ***  (3.21) 
Further  0.8893  ***  (6.41)  0.6175  ***  (3.58)  1.0015  ***  (3.84) 
A level  0.9447  ***  (6.03)  0.8473  ***  (4.41)  0.8983  ***  (3.20) 
GCSE grades A-C  1.0898  ***  (6.90)  0.9336  ***  (5.42)  0.9479  ***  (3.87) 
GCSE grades <C  1.4186  ***  (4.45)  0.7763  ***  (2.40)  0.6535  *  (1.31) 
Other qualification  0.9456  ***  (4.50)  0.8440  ***  (3.46)  0.9639  ***  (3.87) 
Male 0.0372    (2.02)  0.0020   (0.13)  0.0237   (2.02) 
Private education  0.0024    (0.07)  0.0399   (1.28)  0.0061   (0.27) 
White 0.0910    (2.25)  0.1108   (3.28)  -0.0015   (0.06) 
Immigrant 0.0296    (0.72)  0.0696   (2.09)  0.0533   (2.12) 
Married -0.0884    (4.69)  -0.0357   (2.19)  -0.0055   (0.47) 
Trade union  -0.0878    (4.63)  -0.0582   (3.53)  -0.0134   (1.10) 
Firm Size 1-24  0.0927    (3.75)  0.0808   (3.77)  0.0203   (1.30) 
Firm Size 25-99  0.0660    (2.72)  0.0584   (2.76)  0.0079   (0.51) 
Firm Size 100-499  0.0470    (1.96)  0.0437   (2.08)  -0.0019   (0.12) 
Permanent contract  -0.0066    (0.20)  -0.0640   (2.19)  -0.0243   (1.13) 
Controls  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 2,294  2,441  3,105 
Adjusted R squared  0.1659  0.0877  0.0213 
 
***, **,* denotes 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance respectively shown only for intercept and slope coefficientsTABLE 3: Wage Growth across different time horizons plus type of investment 
 5
TH DIFFERENCE  3
RD DIFFERENCE         1
ST DIFFERENCE 
Asset  0.2833  ***  (2.36)  0.2406  ***  (2.80)  0.1533  **  (1.88) 
Shares  0.2443  ***  (2.33)  0.1270  *  (1.34)  0.0829  *  (1.40) 
PEPs  0.2539  **  (1.81)  0.1885  *  (1.43)  0.1063  *  (1.33) 
Unit Trust  0.3132  **  (1.72)  -0.2913  **  (1.75)  -0.0735    (0.85) 
Other Investment  -0.0031    (0.02)  0.0402    (0.23)  -0.1301    (1.25) 
Experience  -0.0799  ***  (6.21)  -0.0507  ***  (4.50)  -0.0669  ***  (3.01) 
Experience squared  0.0118  ***  (4.93)  0.0062  ***  (2.58)  0.0105  ***  (2.36) 
Turnover  -0.1335  *  (1.38)  0.1182    (1.14)  0.3107    (1.14) 
Degree  0.9854  ***  (6.27)  0.6409  ***  (4.05)  0.4682  *  (1.54) 
Further  0.9933  ***  (6.53)  0.5984  ***  (3.83)  1.0107  ***  (3.27) 
A level  1.0452  ***  (6.12)  0.6749  ***  (3.97)  0.7568  ***  (2.39) 
GCSE grades A-C  1.0930  ***  (6.55)  0.9233  ***  (5.90)  1.0638  ***  (3.37) 
GCSE grades <C  1.6133  ***  (4.66)  0.5983  **  (2.19)  0.4231    (0.67) 
Other qualification  0.9177  ***  (4.21)  0.8595  ***  (3.96)  1.0317  ***  (2.51) 
Male 0.0387    (2.10)  0.0048   (0.31)  0.0246   (2.10) 
Private education  0.0059    (0.17)  0.0442   (1.42)  0.0061   (0.27) 
White 0.0968    (2.39)  0.1129   (3.35)  0.0010   (0.04) 
Immigrant 0.0314    (0.76)  0.0669   (2.01)  0.0562   (2.24) 
Married -0.0901    (4.79)  -0.0341   (2.08)  -0.0071   (0.60) 
Trade union  -0.0888    (4.69)  -0.0563   (3.42)  -0.0141   (1.17) 
Firm Size 1-24  0.0920    (3.72)  0.0819   (3.81)  0.0204   (1.30) 
Firm Size 25-99  0.0684    (2.82)  0.0593   (2.80)  0.0066   (0.43) 
Firm Size 100-499  0.0500    (2.08)  0.0468   (2.23)  -0.0001   (0.01) 
Permanent contract  -0.0041    (0.12)  -0.0681   (2.34)  -0.0252   (1.17) 
Controls  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  2,294 2,441 3,105 
Adjusted R squared  0.1700  0.0875  0.0219 
 
***, **,* denotes 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance respectively shown only for intercept and slope coefficients 
 
 TABLE 4: Wage Growth in 5
th Differences Robustness checks: Interactions and instrumentation 
 RISKY  ASSET  INTERACTIONS  INSTRUMENTED ASSET  INSTRUMENTED RISKY ASSET 
INTERACTIONS 
Asset  -  -0.8744  ***  (2.71)  -   
Asset×Shares  0.3381  **  (1.75)  -  0.7682  *  (1.44) 
Asset×PEPs  0.2201    (1.19)  -  0.6633  *  (1.41) 
Asset×Unit Trust  -0.1265    (0.70)  -  0.3704    (0.97) 
Asset×Other Investment  0.1204    (0.54)  -  -0.2343    (0.49) 
Experience  -0.0742  ***  (3.15)  -0.0611  *  (1.53)  -0.1109  **  (2.05) 
Experience squared  0.0099  **  (2.16)  0.0094  *  (1.46)  0.0169  **  (1.96) 
Turnover  -0.2041    (0.94)  0.2559  **  (1.65)  -0.7250  *  (1.42) 
Degree  1.0174  ***  (3.21)  0.2377    (1.01)  1.3798  **  (2.14) 
Further  0.8327  ***  (3.02)  0.4437  **  (2.24)  1.3629  **  (2.19) 
A level  0.7520  ***  (2.61)  0.5182  ***  (2.68)  1.3256  **  (2.13) 
GCSE grades A-C  1.2711  ***  (3.23)  0.5293  ***  (2.95)  1.3429  **  (2.18) 
GCSE grades <C  1.7652  ***  (2.38)  1.6408  ***  (3.67)  2.6215  ***  (2.60) 
Other qualification  1.1218  ***  (2.43)  1.1339  ***  (4.39)  0.9564  **  (1.68) 
Male 0.0419    (2.26)  0.0583   (3.23)  0.0444   (2.41) 
Private education  -0.0013    (0.04)  0.0066   (0.20)  0.0069   (0.20) 
White 0.0883    (2.17)  0.2299   (5.72)  0.0962   (2.38) 
Immigrant 0.0277    (0.67)  0.1371   (3.40)  0.0341   (0.83) 
Married -0.0943    (5.01)  -0.0657   (3.59)  -0.0957   (5.09) 
Trade union  -0.0871    (4.57)  -0.0752   (4.13)  -0.0910   (4.82) 
Firm Size 1-24  0.0938    (3.76)  0.0883   (3.73)  0.0891   (3.60) 
Firm Size 25-99  0.0678    (2.77)  0.0709   (3.06)  0.0682   (2.81) 
Firm Size 100-499  0.0479    (1.98)  0.0593   (2.58)  0.0489   (2.03) 
Permanent contract  -0.0064    (0.19)  0.0447   (1.39)  0.0006   (0.02) 
Controls  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 2,294  2,294  2,294 
Adjusted R squared  0.1587  0.2399  0.1715 
 
***, **,* denotes 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance respectively shown only for intercept and slope coefficients TABLE 5: Wage Growth in 5
th Differences Robustness checks: Controlling for debt, composition and interactions 
  DEBT CONTROL  DEBT AND COMPOSITION RISKY  ASSET  INTERACTIONS 
Asset  0.4481  ***  (4.44)  0.3189  ***  (2.89)    -   
Debt  -0.0176  ***  (5.70)  -0.0169  ***  (5.58)  -0.0176  ***  (5.72) 
Shares    -    0.2016  **  (1.79)    -   
PEPs    -    0.1435    (0.87)    -   
Unit Trust    -    0.2250    (1.10)    -   
Other Investment    -    0.0882    (0.41)    -   
Asset×Shares    -      -    -0.0085    (0.05) 
Asset×PEPs    -      -    -0.3092  *  (1.29) 
Asset×Unit Trust    -      -    -0.1396    (0.51) 
Asset×Other Investment    -      -    -0.0334    (0.11) 
Experience  -0.0594  ***  (9.30)  -0.0629  ***  (10.10)  -0.0558  ***  (8.72) 
Experience squared  0.0076  ***  (5.28)  0.0085  ***  (6.30)  0.0068  ***  (4.53) 
Turnover  -0.0062    (0.10)  -0.0357    (0.61)  0.0154    (0.24) 
Degree  0.7836  ***  (9.10)  0.8203  ***  (9.88)  0.7478  ***  (8.57) 
Further  0.8428  ***  (10.38)  0.8659  ***  (11.02)  0.8209  ***  (10.07) 
A level  0.8762  ***  (9.96)  0.9124  ***  (10.60)  0.8496  ***  (9.68) 
GCSE grades A-C  1.0103  ***  (11.86)  1.0112  ***  (12.12)  0.9865  ***  (11.79) 
GCSE grades <C  1.1419  ***  (7.61)  1.2066  ***  (8.01)  1.1097  ***  (7.58) 
Other qualification  0.8459  ***  (6.83)  0.8391  ***  (6.92)  0.8419  ***  (6.91) 
Male 0.0341    (1.87)  0.0348   (1.90)  0.0329   (1.80) 
Private education  0.0057    (0.16)  0.0072   (0.21)  0.0036   (0.10) 
White 0.0735    (1.82)  0.0765   (1.90)  0.0748   (1.85) 
Immigrant 0.0313    (0.77)  0.0317   (0.78)  0.0308   (0.76) 
Married -0.0607    (3.20)  -0.0626   (3.29)  -0.0599   (3.15) 
Trade union  -0.0878    (4.70)  0.0878   (4.69)  -0.0883   (4.72) 
Firm Size 1-24  0.0921    (3.77)  0.0931   (3.80)  0.0904   (3.68) 
Firm Size 25-99  0.0667    (2.78)  0.0686   (2.86)  0.0653   (2.72) 
Firm Size 100-499  0.0482    (2.03)  0.0503   (2.12)  0.0463   (1.95) 
Permanent contract  -0.0005    (0.02)  0.0003   (0.01)  -0.0001   (0.01) 
Controls  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 2,294  2,294  2,294 
Adjusted R squared  0.1858  0.1863  0.1849 
***, **,* denotes 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance respectively shown only for intercept and slope coefficients TABLE 6: Wage Growth in 5
th Differences Robustness checks: Positive assets, movers and human capital changes 
  POSITIVE ASSET SHARE  JOB MOVERS          RECENT HUMAN CAPITAL 
Asset×Shares  0.2254  *  (1.54)  1.8624  ***  (3.15)  0.7263  **  (2.21) 
Asset×PEPs  0.3295  *  (1.45)  0.0034    (0.01)  0.3482    (1.11) 
Asset×Unit Trust  0.3403    (1.24)  0.9475    (0.99)  -0.1943    (0.58) 
Asset×Other Investment  -0.2043    (0.84)  -0.2671    (0.27)  0.1481    (0.37) 
Employer Training     -      -    -0.5252  ***  (2.33) 
Non-Employer Training    -      -    -0.0223    (0.17) 
Education change 1    -      -    0.0976    (0.75) 
Education change 2    -      -    0.0196    (1.07) 
Experience  -0.1106  ***  (2.54)  -0.0559  ***  (4.46)  -0.0342  **  (1.92) 
Experience squared  0.0180  ***  (2.37)  0.0088  ***  (3.46)  0.0045  *  (1.41) 
Turnover  -0.3336  *  (1.35)    -    -0.1103    (1.05) 
Degree  1.5304  ***  (2.55)  0.6464  ***  (4.35)  0.4469  **  (1.97) 
Further  1.4845  ***  (2.60)  0.7282  ***  (4.38)  0.3854  **  (1.81) 
A level  1.3439  ***  (2.64)  0.4816  ***  (2.95)  0.3359  *  (1.43) 
GCSE grades A-C  1.4671  ***  (2.64)  0.7839  ***  (4.59)  0.6074  ***  (2.37) 
GCSE grades <C  2.4989  **  (2.01)  0.9001  ***  (3.88)  0.8586  **  (2.29) 
Other qualification  0.8092  *  (1.60)  0.8885  ***  (3.71)  0.7790  ***  (3.36) 
Male 0.0308    (0.87)  0.0483   (1.28)  0.0423   (2.29) 
Private education  0.0297    (0.57)  0.0071   (0.09)  -0.0012   (0.03) 
White 0.1303    (1.50)  0.0759   (0.96)  0.0889   (2.18) 
Immigrant 0.0816    (1.05)  0.0049   (0.07)  0.0241   (0.58) 
Married -0.0754    (2.04)  -0.1388   (3.73)  -0.0944   (5.00) 
Trade union  -0.0681    (1.94)  -0.1604   (3.44)  -0.0883   (4.63) 
Firm Size 1-24  0.0329    (0.72)  0.1436   (2.51)  0.0932   (3.74) 
Firm Size 25-99  0.0439    (0.95)  0.0862   (1.50)  0.0672   (2.72) 
Firm Size 100-499  0.0645    (1.48)  0.0137   (0.24)  0.0461   (1.91) 
Permanent contract  0.1689    (2.30)  0.0259   (0.44)  -0.0057   (0.17) 
Controls  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 667  775  2,294 
Adjusted R squared  0.1186  0.2218  0.1590 
 
***, **,* denotes 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance respectively shown only for intercept and slope coefficients Table A1: Asset share model 
  COEFFICIENT              T STATISTIC 
Intercept   -0.2885  ***    (2.48) 
Age   0.0087      (1.23) 
Age Squared    -0.0001      (0.77) 
Degree   0.1066  ***    (3.28) 
Further Education    0.0647  **    (2.25) 
A level    0.0744  ***    (2.39) 
GCSE grades A-C    0.0837  ***    (3.06) 
GCSE grades <C    -0.0061      (0.14) 
Other Qualification    0.0339      (0.83) 
Male   0.0396  **    (2.30) 
White   0.0178      (0.35) 
Immigrant   0.0276      (0.65) 
Married   -0.0367  **    (1.89) 
Permanent Contract    -0.0026      (0.07) 
Real Wage    0.0709  ***    (3.80) 
Unearned Income    0.0302  ***    (6.80) 
Observations 2,294 
Adjusted R squared  0.0605 
 
***, ** denotes 1 and 5 per cent significance respectively 